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English wars are said to have been wars of trade; the
same may be asserted of all commercial actions at law.
Before a legal question can arise in cases affecting com-
mercial values, there must be a commercial dispute. The
case of Coxe Bros. & Co. v. the Lehigh Valley Railroad
Company, before the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the United States Courts, is an illustration of a legal contro-
versy growing out of complicated questions of trade. The
firm of Coxe Bros. & Co. are owners and lessees of about
33,0oo acres of land in the so-called Lehigh region of the
anthracite coal section of Pennsylvania. The output of
these lands in i888 was a little over a million, tons of hard
coal. The annual output may vary from one and a half t6
two million tons, forming from three to four per cent. of
the total production of anthracite. This coal reached the
market in i888 (when the proceedings before the Interstate
Commerce Commission were begun) over the lines of the
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Lehiglh Valley, the Pennsylvania and the New Jersey
Central Railroads. The tolts charged by these roads, from
the junction point of Coxe's mine branches to tidewater at
New York harbor, were, in that year, $i.8o per ton on the
sizes of hard coal used for domestic purposes, $i.4o per ton
on the sizes called pea and buckwheat, and $I. 2o on the
culm or waste.
The anthracite region of Pennsylvania, practically
covering the whole supply of hard coal for the United
States, contains about 470 square miles. Of the annual
product of this region, amounting in 189i to about 4o,ooo,-
ooo tons, about one-fourth is mined by individual operators,
-that is, by those who own or work the coal lands inde-
pendent of the great carrying companies. The other three-
fourths of the supply is mined by coal companies which
are owned by the seven great coal railroads, these, of
course, having the preponderating influence upon all
questions of trade policy. Some of these railroads were
originally started as mining corporations, and gradually
extended their rail lines in order to find an outlet for their
coal. Others bought lands, or bought control of coal com-
panies owning lands, in order that their tonnage of coal
might be forever secured to them. The Philadelphia and
Reading Railroad, through its subsidiary corporation, the
Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company, made
extensive purchases of land as late as the decade 1870 to
188o. Out of the ownership or control of the limited
acreage underlaid with hard coal have grown some perplex-
ing questions. Coxe Bros. & Co. are the largest firm
among the so-called individual operators. Their suit
against the Lehigh Valley involved two principal points.
One was, that the tariffs established by the railways on
anthracite were so high as to cause hard coal to be displaced
by bituminous, or soft coal, for manufacturing and steam-
producing purposes.
The average distance to New York harbor from all the
mines in the Lehigh region'is 149 miles. The average
distance from the Snow Shoes bituminous region is 295
miles, -and the tolls $2.25 per ton; from which it will be
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seen that the railways carried soft coal at ratesbalmost
half those charged anthracite for a corresponding distance.
A further fact is, that while anthracite has about doubled
its output in the last decade, the bituminous production
has been quadrupled. It was argued that these two facts
explained each other, and that if lower tariffs were to be'
charged on anthracite by the carriers, hard coal would
again supplant bituminous in the factories of New England
and elsewhere. In spite of the rail charges, higher in the
aggregate, though lower proportionately, the selling price at
tidewater was about one dollar less per ton for soft than for
hard coal. For steam purposes it is found that bitu-
minous is about one-tenth better than anthracite. More-
over, during the ten. years from i88o to i89o hard coal has
been quoted at about the same price, allowing for fluctua-
tions, but soft coal has declined one-third; further, the sup-
ply of anthracite is practically limited to the region of
about 470 square miles in Pennsylvania, while bituminous
coal is found over the greater part of the country, the area
underlaid being estimated at over 200,000 square miles.
This great disparity in the available supply would seem to
indicate that nature had decided the question between these
two coals for ordinary purposes, for the great and increas-
ingly important use in the making of -steam, whether in
factory or locomotive boilers. For domestic use the hard
coal is everywhere preferred, so that it may be said, because
of the limited supply and valuable properties, that anthra-
cite is a special fuel, a luxury, and that the better policy
would be to treat if as such.
To this there is the technical objection that coal is
coal, and that carriers have no right to discriminate be-
tween the two kinds, which, indeed, cannot always be told,.
the one from the other, even by experts. It is true that.
there is -no dividing line agreed upon, separating anthra-
cite from bituminous coal. Nevertheless, the distinction
is real, and forms the practical basis of trade. Just so we
find it hard to tell the precisg point at which day becomes
night, though of the propriety of the distinction we are
assured.
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The railroad systems of the United States differ in their
policy toward these coals. The New England roads gen-
erally charge the same rate upon both; the roads of the
Middle States distinguish sharply between them in their
tariffs ; the practice on lines -west of Chicago varies. Upon
closer analysis, however, it will be seen that these differing
policies, in different parts of the United States, are not dic-
tated by favoritism to either kind of coal as a commodity,
but rest roughly on commercial conditions. The carriers,
in short, charge what they think they can fairly and easily
collect as between the two coals. In New England the
total cost to consumers of anthracite is not materially
affected by the same charge on both kinds, and, besides,
the supplanting of hard coal by soft is not yet complete.
On the other hand, at the West, where the high price of
anthracite puts it out of competition with bituminous for
ordinary uses, in the question of the proper railway Tate,
the supposed rivalry is very little, if at all, considered ; the
investigation of the traffic officer is limited to the problem,
how much he can fairly charge on hard coal, without check-
ing its consumption for the only purpose to which it is ap-
plicable, so far from the mines-that of domestic use. In
some special cases it is also burned where factories are
located in good neighborhoods, in cities, and where the
smoke and smudge of soft coal would be too offensive.
The Interstate Commerce Act forbids, not mere discrimi-
nation, but unjust discrimination. The drawing of dis-
tinctions between the many articles c~rried by our rail-
ways, and the consequent sharing of railway expenses
among these different articles according as these may be
able commercially to bear them (which is* the theory of
railway classifications and tariffs), have been the cause, in
great part, of the enormous development of our railway
freighting business in the United States. We cannot now
question the right of discriminating one rate or one article
from another; the only point which should be considered
is whether the discrimination is just. Our railways carry
the raw material, wheat, and the manufactured product,
flour, at the same rate, though, if warranted, they could
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rightly put a higher tariff upon the manufactured article,
as they do in other lines of trade.. They at one time car-
ried all grains at the same rate, though these, to a certain
extent, are competitive products in our markets. Now
corn is sometimes classed lower than wheat, and in time
each kind of grain may have its own rate fixed upon, after
considering its own separate merits and circumstances in
our markets. That at one time or on some roads one tariff
covered all breadstuffs, is not a good commercial argument
against separate rates on wheat, corn, oats and barley, if
trade conditions at any time require separate tariffs. So in
coal. That at one time or on some roads anthracite and
bituminous coals were charged the same rate, is not a good
argument against a separation of tariffs, if such separation
comes to have justification in existing circumstances. Such
justification is apparently furnished by the quantity in the
ground-so great and so widely distributed in one case, and
so small in the other-andby the properties of the two coals
which give to each its special fitness for specific uses. We
cannot say whether the increasing use of soft coal induced
the lowering of rates, or whether lower rates brought about
the greater consumption; but we are reasonably sure that
the result is an adjustment of rates to natural conditions,
and is, therefore, correctly based.
Another point brought up in the case was the charge
that existing tolls were unjust to the individual operators,
because when prices were low the coal-mining companies
lost money ; but their owners, the coal-carrying companies,
make large profits in transportation, with the result that
the separate operators also lost money in mining, but could
not recoup themselves-in short, that the railways dis-'
criminated unjustly against their individual shippers by
making up the losses to their own mining companies from
their profits as carriers. This complex situation grew out
of the ownership of the greater part of the anthracite coal
lands by coal companies, who were owned in turn by the
carriers. The capital required to own and operate both
railroad and mine companies was a certain sum. This
varied with the different railways according to the different
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circumstances of each. And, as is the rule in all combined
businesses, the profits of both companies, in the course of
years, tended to become such as would pay a fair return
upon the capital invested in both, considered as a whole.
Naturally, also, in the course of time the stockholders and
officers looked to the profit of the year as a vindication of
the management, so that the details-which of the com-
bined companies lost and which earned money-would be
considered of minor importance. This combined but not
separately-stated result would all the more easily come to be
the main consideration of the managers, because of the pe-
culiar condition of the coal trade. The anthracite coal in
the ground is a definite quantity; every ton mined is so
much taken from the limited supply. It has been esti-
mated that some of the coal fields will be exhausted before
many years, and that before the middle of the next cent-
ury there will be a decline in the quantity possible to be
mined. Because of this fact anthracite ought, on this ac-
count, to be considered every year more and more as a
special deposit and more and more valuable. Yet it is
also true that the annual output of the coal lands could be
much increased, and in some cases doubled, if such in-
creased annual output could be sold. The seven large
operating companies have never been able to agree, for any
length of time, on the probable demand or on the propor-
tion of the output to which each company should mine.
In addition, these companies, when agreed among them-
selves, have not controlled completely the individual oper-
ators who furnish about a fourth of their tonnage. The
result of these conflicting interests was to lead the stock-
holders and officers into the belief that the evils of the
trade were almost incurable, and that the only way to real-
ize a profit from the investment, as a whole, was to obtain
it from that which they thought could be controlled more
easily than the output, the tolls from transportation.
These were generally (with occasional exceptions, of
course) fixed (either directly or on a percentage of the tide-
water price) at such a tariff as left large profits to the
carrier, and figured out per ton per mile to be twice the
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rates charged on other low-priced commodities by other
railways. A profit was thereby assured, even though the
mining itself should be unprofitable. But the success of
the individual operator depended upon th profitableness
of the mine, and not upon that of the transportation com-
pany. It was estimated by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission that the interest on the capital loaned by the Le-
high Valley Railroad to its subsidiary mining company was
equivalent to a rebate of io cents per ton against Coxe
Bros. & Co.'s coal. It was also the practice of the coal
company to buy coal from other collieries, and, sending it to
market over the railroad, to sell such purchased coal, as
well as its own, at prices which sometimes yielded a profit
and sometimes did not. This loss under cost at the mines,
plus the published transportation rate, was considered by
the Interstate Commission to be a discrimination against
the individual operator and in favor of the subsidiary min-
ing company, because such loss was finally made up to the
mining company by the railroad. Altogether the Commis-
sion thought the discrimination amounted to 30 cents per
ton onl domestic sizes in I888, the year of the suit. The
exact amount of unfair discrimination in the tolls on an-
thracite to tidewater, as they were in 1888, must, of course,
be purely an estimate. The Commissioners thought they
were moderate in their proposed reduction. The accounts
and policies for the carrying and mining corporations are
so intermingled that no exact statement of their business
can be had. The trouble is that, so far as th-ree-quarters
of the persons interested are concerned, no such statement
is necessary. The complaining one-quarter are in a hope-
less minority, and are confronted by a situation whose con-
ditions have settled themselves on lines adverse to them.
Apparently, therefore, they must soon have entered legal
protest or have suffered loss of profits and finally of lands
and capital.
As a theoretic solution of the problem, it may be well
to consider it as a question of profit-sharing, as such it
really is or ought to be. A small part of the coal goes to
tidewater on a percentage basis, 40 per cent. of the tide-
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water price being the usual toll in such cases. The general
toll was, in 1888, $i. 8o per ton, reduced shortly afterward,
on domestic sizes, to $1.70 per ton from the mines to tide-
water. When the price of domestic coal averages $3.50 per
ton at New York (and it is sometimes lower), this would
leave the operator $I.70 per ton at the mines. The cost of
producing coal is a difficult question to answer precisely,
for it varies with circumstances and localities. For an
average we may put it at $1.45 per ton for wages and sup-
plies. To this must be added about 35 cents per ton for
average royalty (the royalty being the price paid the owner
of the ground by the operator), and io cents for commis-
sions on sales, a total, say, of $I. 90 per ton, without consider-
ing interest on capital or depreciation. The capital of the
omplainants, Coxe Bros. & Co., amounted to several mill-
ions of dollars. Altogether, and speaking in round num-
bers by averages, it is considered fair to estimate that the
niining operator or company makes no profit, in the true
sense of the-word, unless a higher price than $2 per ton is
obtained at the colliery. On the basis of $3.50 per ton at
tidewater, allowing $. 8o for railway tolls, this calculation
would show a loss to the operator of 30 cents per ton. The
average cost of carrying hard coal from the mines to New
York harbor has been theoretically determined by the Inter-
state Commission to be 93 cents, and the cost of mining, as
we have seen, $. 8o; deducting these amounts from $3.75, an
assumed possible average for coal at tidewater, we have 97
cents profit to be divided between carrier and operator.
Giving two-thirds of this profit to the carrier would be
equivalent to a rate of $1-57 per ton; if divided equally
between carrier and operator, it would give $1.42 to the
former, and $2.33 to the latter. These computations are, of
course, purely theoretical, and are inserted merely to-show
what might be the prices if the business of mining were
separated from the carrying.
No doubt one result of a reduction in tolls on anthra-
cite would be to call the attention of the railway managers
again to an old problem in the coal trade-how to limit the
supply to the demand-with this difference, that whereas
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now their dividends are in a measure assured without forc-
ing an answer to this old question of limiting the output,
under a lower rate they would feel compelled to find at
least a partial solution.
If we assume the theory to be correct which limits the
proper use, broadly speaking, of anthracite to domestic
purposes, leaving the steam market generally to bituminous
coal, it follows that we thereby narrow the possible demand
for hard coal. The quantity required for domestic or
special purposes is small compared with the amount of all
kinds of coal mined and consumed in the United States,
and this required quantity of hard coal will increase from
year to year but slowly, only as population increases and as
a higher standard of home comfort obtains among us. As
a matter of fact, the shipments of anthracite have increased
for a decade in greater proportion than this theory would
warrant, but there are explauations. In the first place, as
before stated, although the contents of the anthracite fields
are limited, and before half a century will probably show
positive signs of exhaustion, yet the possible annual output
now is greater than the actual, large as this latter is. Since
railroad and individual operators have not been able to
agree upon the proportion each miner is entitled to in any
plan of restriction, the total quantity produced has been in
excess of the demand for the purposes named. According
to a well-known rule in manufacturing, while such over-
production has often brought the price of coal at the
collieries below cost, yet the operator, having invested
capital in the outfit and employed his men, cannot stop
operations because the price is not remunerative, since
stoppage would usually entail a still greater loss. Hence,
practically, the supply is not, and under existing conditions
cannot be, strictly regulated to correspond to trade require-
ments. If the conditions, therefore, are allowed to con-
tinue, they must work themselves out by heavy losses to
the weaker parties in the end.
Another explanation of the fact that shipments are
larger than the domestic demand is to be found .in the
quantity of small coal sold. In mining the large sizes of
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anthracite, there remains smaller sizes of coal called buck-
wheat, pea and culm, the latter being coal dust. On tl~e
ground that while the larger sizes were valuable and should
pay higher -rates, the smaller sizes were fairly a competing
product with bituminous and should be charged less, the
carriers generally have transported these small sizes at forty
cents or sixty cents less per ton to tidewater. Owing to a
variety of reasons not necessary to state here, these small
sizes have not been entirely successful as against soft coal,
but are so to a certain degree. Of the .large increase in
recent years in shipments of anthracite, a good part has
been in these smaller sizes or culm. The increase in do-
mestic sizes during the ten years was I8 per cent., while
in the inferior .product it was 139 per cent. In 1879 the
small sizes and waste constituted but 17 per cent. of the
shipments; now these make up nearly one-third.
The public have a real interest in helping to stop this
waste in an important article, limited in quantity, like
anthracite coal.. It ought to be possible to arrange the coal
output so that only as much should be mined as would suf-
fice to supply the domestic and special demands; then our
children would not be deprived of a luxury which this gen-
eration is enjoying and wasting. Such a plan requires the
combination of some kind between the coal companies, so
that some person or persons should decide for the whole
trade what the output fairly should be, and what propor-
tion should be allotted to each company. This would
involve restriction, and this in turn would require that the
quantity needed should return a fair profit to the miner.
It is at this suggestion that the public may be expected to
protest. But whether right or wrong on the general sub-
ject of monopolies and trusts, it seems clear that the public,
in the matter of coal, would have no cause for alarm or
complaint. The price of anthracite cannot be put extor-
tionately high even though a strong combination be formed.
Gas, oil and, more than all, cheap bituminous coal must
always fix a limit beyond which the price of anthracite can-
not go without stopping consumption. A luxury, such as
we have assumed anthracite to be, is the first thing to be
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given up if the cost should be too high, particularly if a
number of other fuels, not so good for comfort and cleanli-
ness, but nearly or quite as good for heating and cooking,
can be had at much cheaper prices.
The point in this matter is, that since the people at
large would not be injured but rather benefited by a better
control over a special gift of nature, popular opposition to
a moderate restriction of coal mining bught, when the facts
becomd known, to die away.
In any plan for restriction the independent operators
must be consulted. They control a quarter of the output,
and could, by active mining, break down the market, no
matter what the great companies decided without them.
Altogether, a very small output and a correspondingly ex-
tortionate price upon anthracite are not possible. The
possible thing is a little better arrangement about present
output and wholesale prices, and this the public, in its own
interest and that of succeeding generations, ought to sup-
port.
But the situation, it will be seen, is made difficult by
the large profit now obtained by the carriers as compared
with the small profit, or even the loss, of the mining oper-
ator. This breeds indifference to trade evils on the part
of the railroads, their officers and salesagents. If a fair
division could be agreed upon, either by negotiation or
through the law courts-the legal complications of this lat-
ter course are great, though the economic facts are clear-
then a way would be opened for a discussion of the further
question on the part of all concerned of restricting, the sup-
ply of anthracite to the proper demand for it. It would be
a mistake to suppose that the case of Coxe Bros. & Co., if
decided favorably to them, would solve all the trade prob-
lems. But since justice and law seem to be on their side,
such an agreement or decision would be a long step toward
a solution of these other questions.
Public opinion ought to sustain, and not condemn,
any efforts made, or which may be made, to settle the
complicated anthracite situation on a basis that shall be
fair to the miners, the carriers and the consumers.
